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Purvag Patel, Chet Langin, Feng Yu, and Shahram Rahimi
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, USA
Abstract—Our research created a network Intrusion Detection
Math (ID Math) consisting of two components: (1) a way of
specifying intrusion detection types in a manner which is more
suitable for an analytical environment; and (2) a computational
model which describes methodology for preparing intrusion de-
tection data stepwise from network packets to data structures in
a way which is appropriate for sophisticated analytical methods
such as statistics, data mining, and computational intelligence.
We used ID Math in a production Self-Organizing Map (SOM)
intrusion detection system named ANNaBell as well as in the
SOM+ Diagnostic System which we developed.
Index Terms—Computational intelligence, Data Mining, ID
Math, Intrusion Detection Types, Log Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Every hacker in the world is one’s neighbor on the In-
ternet, which results in attack defense and detection being
pervasive both at home and work. Although hundreds of
papers have been written on a large variety of methods of
intrusion detection—from log analysis, to packet analysis,
statistics, data mining, and sophisticated computational intel-
ligence methods—and even though similar data structures are
used by the various types of intrusion analysis, apparently little
has been published on a methodical mathematical description
of how data is manipulated and perceived in network intrusion
detection from binary network packets to more manageable
data structures such as vectors and matrices.
We developed a comprehensive methodology of information
security Intrusion Detection Math (ID Math) which overhauls
concepts of intrusion detection including a new model of
intrusion detection types and a computational model created in
order to lay a foundation for data analysis. Our intrusion de-
tection types are necessary, complete, and mutually exclusive.
They facilitate apples-to-apples and oranges-to-oranges com-
parisons of intrusion detection methods and provide the ability
to focus on different kinds of intrusion detection research. Our
computational model converts intrusion detection data from
packet analysis step-by-step to sophisticated computational
intelligent methods. These concepts of ID Math were imple-
mented in a production Self-Organizing Map (SOM) intrusion
detection system named ANNaBell and were introduced in
publication as part of the SOM+ Diagnostic System in [1].
Section II describes background and literature. We describe
the new types of local network intrusion detection in section
III, and we propose the network intrusion detection computa-
tion model in section IV. The conclusion is in section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and respond-
ing to malicious activity targeted at computing and networking
sources [2]. Over the years, types of intrusion detection have
been labeled in various linguistic terms, with often vague
or overlapping meanings. Not all researchers have used the
same labels with the same meanings. To demonstrate the need
for consistent labeling of intrusion types, previous types of
intrusion detection are listed below in order to show the variety
of types of labeling that have been used in the past.
Denning [3] in 1986 referred to intrusion detection methods
which included profiles, anomalies, and rules. Her profiling
included metrics and statistical models. She referred to misuse
in terms of insiders who misused privileges.
Young in 1987 [4] defined two types of monitors: appear-
ance monitors and behavior monitors, the first performing
static analysis of systems to detect anomalies and the second
examining behavior.
Lunt [5] in 1988 referred to the misuse of insiders; the
finding of abnormal behavior by determining departures from
historically established norms of behavior; a priori rules; and
using expert system technology to codify rules obtained from
system security officers. A year later, in 1989, Lunt mentioned
knowledge-based, statistical, and rule-based intrusion detec-
tion. In 1993, she referred to model-based reasoning [6].
Vaccaro and Liepins [7] in 1989 stated that misuse manifests
itself as anomalous behavior. Hellman, Liepins, and Richards
[8] in 1992 stated that computer use is either normal or misuse.
Denault, et al, [9] in 1994 referred to detection-by-appearance
and detection-by-behavior. Forrest, et al, [10] in 1994 said
there were three types: activity monitors, signature scanners,
and file authentication programs.
Intrusion detection types began converging on two main
types in 1994: misuse and anomaly. Crosbie and Spafford [11]
defined misuse detection as watching for certain actions being
performed on certain objects. They defined anomaly detection
as deviations from normal system usage patterns. Kumar and
Spafford [12] also referred to anomaly and misuse detection in
1994. Many other researchers, too numerous to mention them
all, have also referred to misuse and anomaly as the two main
types of intrusion detection, from 1994 up to the present time.
However, other types of intrusion detection continue to be
mentioned. Ilgun, Kemmerer, and Porras [13] in 1995 referred
to four types: Threshold, anomaly, rule-based, and model-
based. Esmaili, Safavi-Naini, and Pieprzyk [14] in 1996 said
the two main methods are statistical and rule-based expert
systems.
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Debar, Dacier, and Wespi, [15] in 1999 referred to two
complementary trends: (1) The search for evidence based on
knowledge; and, (2) the search for deviations from a model
of unusual behavior based on observations of a system during
a known normal state. The first they referred to as misuse
detection, detection by appearance, or knowledge-based. The
second they referred to as anomaly detection or detection by
behavior. Bace [16] in 2000 described misuse detection as
looking for something bad and anomaly detection as looking
for something rare or unusual. Marin-Blazquez and Perez [17]
in 2008 said that there are three main approaches: signature,
anomaly, and misuse detection.
While descriptive, these various labels over time are incon-
sistent and do not favor an analytical discussion of network
intrusion detection. Not all of them are necessary, they are not
mutually exclusive, and as individual groups they have not
been demonstrated as being complete. Rather than arbitrate
which of these labels should be used and how they should
be defined, new labels have been created to describe types of
local network intrusion detection in a manner which favors an
analytical environment.
III. LLNIDS TYPES OF INTRUSION DETECTION
The new types are explained below, but first some ter-
minology needs to be stated in order to later describe the
types. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is software or
an appliance that detects intrusions. A Network Intrusion
Detection System (NIDS) is an appliance that detects an
intrusion on a network. In this research, network means a
landline network. Local network intrusion detection refers to
the instant case of network intrusion detection.
Figure 1 illustrates the location of a Local Landline Network
Intrusion Detection System (LLNIDS) as used in this research.
The LLNDS in Figure 1 is represented by the rounded box in
the center labelled “Local NIDS”. It is an IDS on a landline
between a local network and the Internet. The point of view
of this research is from inside the LLNIDS. Users on the local
network may have other ways of accessing the Internet that
bypass the LLNIDS, such as wireless and dialup. This research
is restricted to the LLNIDS as described here.
Examples of detection which are not Local Landline Net-
work Intrusion Detection (LLNID) include detection on the
host computer, detection by someone else out on the Internet,
or detection by someone out in the world, such as someone
witnessing a perpetrator bragging in a bar. This research
concerns LLNID and the new types described in this paper
refer to LLNID. A network intrusion in this context means
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one or more transmissions across the network that involves
an intrusion. A single Internet transmission is often called a
packet. Therefore, using this terminology, the physical mani-
festation of an intrusion on a network is one or more packets,
and intrusion detection is the detection of these packets that
constitute intrusions. In this context, intrusion detection is
similar to data mining. Intrusion detection research needs a
model of types of intrusions and types of intrusion detection
that benefits analysis of methods. This research focuses only
on LLNID. These are the proposed types of intrusions for the
special case of local landline network intrusion detection that
facilitate intrusion detection research analysis in the LLNID
context:
• Type 1 Intrusion: An intrusion which can be positively
detected in one or more packets in transit on the local
network in a given time period.
• Type 2 Intrusion: An intrusion for which one or more
symptoms (only) can be detected in one or more packets
in transit on the local network in a given time period.
• Type 3 Intrusion: An intrusion which cannot be detected
in packets in transit on the network in a given time period.
These three types of intrusions are necessary for analytical
research in order to indicate and compare kinds of intrusions.
A positive intrusion is different than only a symptom of an
intrusion because immediate action can be taken on the first
whereas further analysis should be taken on the second. Both
of these are different than intrusions which have been missed
by an LLNIDS. To show that these three types are mutually
exclusive and are complete for a given time period, consider
all of the intrusions for a given time period, such as a 24-hour
day. The intrusions which were positively identified by the
LLNIDS are Type1 intrusions. Of the remaining intrusions,
the ones for which the LLNIDS found symptoms are Type
2. Here the hypothesis is that the LLNIDS can only find an
intrusion positively or only one or more symptoms are found.
No other results can be returned by the LLNIDS. Therefore,
the remaining intrusions are Type 3, which are intrusions not
detected by the LLNIDS. No other types of intrusions in this
context are possible.
Figure 2 is a diagram that illustrates the types of intrusions
as described above. An intrusion is either Type 1, Type 2, Type
3, or it is not an intrusion.
Those were the types of intrusions. Next are the types of
intrusion detection. There are three types of network intrusion
detection that correspond to the three types of intrusions in
the LLNID context:
• Type 1 Network Intrusion Detection: A Type 1 Intrusion
is detected in a given time period.
3• Type 2 Network Intrusion Detection: One or more symp-
toms (only) of a Type 2 Intrusion are detected in a given
time period.
• Type 3 Network Intrusion Detection: No intrusion is
detected in a given time period.
Admittedly, Type 3 is not a detection but the lack of
detection. It is included because these three types of detection
correspond to the three types of intrusions and Type 3 Intrusion
Detection facilitates analysis of intrusion detection methods.
Examples of Type 3 Intrusion Detection are nothing was
detected; no attempt was made at detection; an intrusion
occurred but was not detected by the LLNIDS; and, no
intrusion occurred. All of these have the same result: there
was no detection of an intrusion by the LLNIDS.
Each of the three network intrusion detection types is
necessary to describe all of the types of intrusion detection.
A positive detection of an intrusion is different than just a
symptom of an intrusion because a positive detection can
be immediately acted upon while a symptom indicates that
further analysis is needed. Both of these are different than
intrusions that are missed by network intrusion detection. To
show that these types are mutually exclusive and complete for
a given time period, consider an LLNIDS looking at network
packets for a given time period, say a 24-hour day. For all
packets that the LLNIDS determines positively indicates an
intrusion the LLNIDS has accomplished Type 1 intrusion
detection. Of the remaining packets, for each packet that the
LLNIDS determines is a symptom of an intrusion the LLNIDS
has accomplished Type 2 intrusion detection. The remaining
packets represent Type 3 intrusion detection. These three types
of network intrusion detection are complete in this context
because they cover all possibilities of intrusion detection. In
common language, Type 1 is a certainty, Type 2 is a symptom,
and Type 3 is an unknown.
Those were types of intrusion detection. Next are types of
methods and alerts. LLNID methods can be defined in terms
of the three intrusion types:
• Type 1 NID Method/Alert: A method that detects a Type
1 Intrusion and an alert that indicates a Type 1 Intrusion.
• Type 2 NID Method/Alert: A method that detects a
symptom of a Type 2 Intrusion and an alert that indicates
a symptom (only) of a Type 2 Intrusion.
• Type 3 NID Method/Alert: A method that does not exist,
thus there is no alert.
These types of methods and alerts are necessary to differentiate
that some methods are positively correct, other methods only
indicate symptoms of intrusions, and some methods do not
exist. They are mutually exclusive because a local method
either positively indicates an intrusion (Type 1), it only detects
a symptom of an intrusion (Type 2), or it does not exist (Type
3). They are complete because there are no other types of
methods in this context.
Those were types of methods and alerts. Next are types
of false positives. The term false positive generally has meant
that an intrusion detection system has sent a false alarm. False
positives are generally undesirable because the false positive
rate of intrusion detection systems can be high and can use up a
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lot of seemingly unnecessary, and limited, resources. However,
with these new types, the concept of a false positive is different
for different intrusion detection types in the LLNIDS context.
• Type 1 False Positive: A Type 1 Method produces an
alarm in the absence of an intrusion.
• Type 2 False Positive: A Type 2 method produces an
alarm in the absence of an intrusion.
• Type 3 False Positive: Does not exist because no alarm
is produced.
A Type 1 False Positive indicates a problem with the Type
1 method which should be corrected. Type 2 False Positives
are expected because Type 2 Methods do not positively detect
intrusions, they only detect symptoms of intrusions. There is
no Type 3 False Positive because no detections and alerts
are produced for Type 3 Intrusion Detections. These types
of false positive are necessary because they each indicate
separate network intrusion detection issues. Type 1 is a net-
work intrusion detection problem which needs to be corrected
and Type 2 is expected. The two types of false positive are
mutually exclusive and complete because only Type 1 Network
Intrusion Detection can produce a Type 1 False Positive and
only Type 2 Network Intrusion Detection can produce a Type
2 False Positive. No other types of false positives in this
context are possible. Since Type 1 and Type 2 of local network
intrusion detection methods are mutually exclusive, these are
also mutually exclusive.
Figure 3 is a Venn diagram which illustrates types of
intrusion detection in the LLNIDS context. The horizontal
line separates intrusions at the top from non-intrusions at the
bottom. A Type 1 detection is in the upper left of the circle if
it is actually an intrusion or it is in the lower left of the circle
if it is a false positive. A Type 2 detection is in the upper right
of the circle if it is actually an intrusion or it is in the lower
right of the circle if it is a false positive. Everything outside
of the circle is Type 3 detection whether it is an intrusion or
not.
This typing system allows illustration that empirically most
intrusion detection is not Type 1 (positive detections), but Type
2 (symptoms of detections), and Type 3 (missed detections).
This differentiation is essential in proceeding in a scientific
way for improved intrusion detection.
Previously labeled types of intrusion detection do not fit
neatly into these three new types. Misuse detection, for
example, in some cases could indicate a definite intrusion
and would then be Type 1, or it could indicate only symp-
toms of intrusions in other cases and would then be Type
2. The comparison of false positives of different methods
of Misuse Detection is an invalid technique unless Type 1
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methods are compared only with Type 2 methods. Anomaly
detection, for example, would tend to be Type 2, but some
anomalies could clearly indicate intrusions and would be
Type 1. Type 1 and Type 2 methods of Anomaly Detection
should be separated before making any comparisons. Likewise
with intrusion detection labels based on activity, appearance,
authentication analysis, behavior, knowledge, models, profiles,
rules, signature, static analysis, statistics, and thresholds. These
are still useful as descriptive terms, but they are not as useful in
analyzing methods of determining whether or not an intrusion
has occurred because they allow the comparisons of apples
and oranges in numerous ways. The labels Type 1 and Type
2 give us more analytical information: either an intrusion has
occurred or else only a symptom of an intrusion has occurred.
Type 3 intrusions tell us that we should find out why an
intrusion was not detected in the network traffic so that we
can create new rules to find more intrusions in the future.
Previously labeled types of intrusion detection do not give us
as much analytical information as do types 1, 2, and 3.
Using this system, one can clearly state objectives of LLNID
research in a new way which was previously only implied. The
significance of given time period is apparent in the descriptive
of these objectives because the objectives are stated in terms
of progress from one time period to another time period. Here
are specifics for LLNID research:
• Type 3 NID Research: Find ways of detecting intrusions
that are currently not being detected, moving them up to
type 2 or 1 intrusion detection.
• Type 2 NID Research: Improve Type 2 Intrusion Detec-
tion with the goal of moving it up to Type 1 Intrusion
Detection.
• Type 1 NID Research: Improve Type 1 Intrusion Detec-
tion so that it is faster, uses fewer resources, and has
fewer false positives.
Each of these types of research are necessary because
finding new methods of intrusion detection is different than
improving symptom detection which is different than making
Type 1 Intrusion Detection more efficient. They are also com-
plete because there are no other types of intrusion detection
research in this context.
Table 1 summarizes the types discussed in this section.
These are some ways of how researchers can use these types:
research that compares false positive rates of Type 1 methods
with false positive rates of Type 2 methods is not valid because
Type 1 methods are not supposed to have false positives
whereas Type 2 methods are expected to have false positives.
Discounting Type 3 intrusion detection because of the amount
of time taken may be irrelevant if otherwise the intrusion
would not be found, at all. Proposing that intrusion prevention
will replace intrusion detection is a false claim so long as types
2 and 3 intrusions continue to exist. Rather than disregarding
Type 2 methods, research should attempt to fuse the results of
Type 2 methods in order to move them up to Type 1.
IV. THE LLNIDS COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
A few number of researchers have described intrusion
detection in limited mathematical ways, with [18][19], in the
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF LLNID TYPES
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Intrusion This can be posi-
tively detected by
LLNIDS
A symptom of this
can be detected by
LLNIDS
This is not de-
tected by LL-
NIDS
Intrusion
Detection
This positively de-
tects an intrusion
This detects one
or more symptoms
(only) of an intru-
sion
An intrusion is
not detected
Method How to positively
detect an intrusion
How to positively
detect a symptom
of an intrusion
An intrusion is
not detected
Alert This positively sig-
nifies an intrusion
This signifies a
symptom of an
intrusion
This does not
occur
False Pos-
itive
An alert positively
signifies an intru-
sion, but there is no
intrusion
An alert signifies a
symptom of an in-
trusion, but there is
no intrusion
An alert does
not occur
Research Improve Type 1 In-
trusion Detection,
such as by increas-
ing the speed of de-
tection, using less
resources, and hav-
ing fewer false pos-
itives
Improve Type 2
Intrusion Detection
so that it becomes
Type 1 Intrusion
Detection
Detect Type
3 intrusions
so that they
become Type 2
or Type 1
context of attack trees, and [20], in the context of game theory,
being representative. Network Monitoring was formulated as
a language recognition problem in [21].
We propose Local Landline Network Intrusion Detection
System (LLNIDS) Computational Model that covers intrusion
detection data from packet analysis to sophisticated com-
putational intelligent methods. This ID Math computational
model begins with a transmission of digital network traffic
and proceeds stepwise to higher concepts. The terminology
for the input data changes depending upon the level of the
concept. The lowest level concept in this research is the
network transmission, which is a series of bits called a frame
or a packet. Frame refers to a type of protocol, such as
Media Access Control (MAC), which is used between two
neighboring devices, where the series of bits are framed by
a header at the start and a particular sequence of bits at the
end. Packet refers to many types of protocols, such as Internet
Message Control Protocol (ICMP), User Datagram Protocol
(UDP), and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). A packet
is used for hops between numerous devices, such as Internet
traffic. The length of the series of bits in a packet is often
indicated at certain locations in the headers of the packets.
A frame passes a packet between two neighboring devices,
where another frame passes the same packet between the next
two devices, and subsequent frames keep passing the packet
forward until the journey of the packet is concluded. Since
frames and packets are variable lengths, they are represented
by a set of objects which represent the various elements of
information inside the frame or packet.
A Transmission (T ) consists of a set of objects (o) repre-
senting elements of information in that transmission.
T = {o1, o2, o3, . . . , onT } (1)
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where nT ∈ N . Examples of objects in a transmission are
the source MAC address, source IP address, source port,
destination MAC address, destination IP address, destination
port, the apparent direction of the traffic, protocols used, flags
set, sequence numbers, checksums, type of service, time to
live, fragmentation information, and the content being sent.
Figure 4 is a sample packet as displayed by tcpdump [22].
Header information extracted from the packet is displayed
across the top. The leftmost column is the byte count in
hexadecimal. The packet itself is displayed in hexadecimal
in columns in the middle. Character representations of the
hexadecimal code, when possible, are shown on the right. The
packet is a transmission set, T, with variable length objects as
elements. Example object elements for this set are the protocol,
UDP, and the destination port, 16402, both of which have been
extracted from the packet code.
If an intrusion occurs on a local landline, it occurs in one
or more T , so LLNID means inspecting T ’s for intrusions.
Not all of the available data in T has equal relevance to
intrusion detection and the reduction of the amount of data is
desirable in order to reduce the resources needed for analysis.
This process has been called feature deduction [23], feature
reduction [23], feature ranking [24], or feature selection [23].
The first feature selection must be done manually by a knowl-
edge engineer, after that the features can be ranked and/or
reduced computationally. Soft Computing methods often use
data structures of n-tuple formats, such as one-dimensional
arrays, sets, vectors, and/or points in space. Since sets can
be used as a basis to describe these data structures, the next
step in the computational model is to convert features of T into
higher levels of sets which can be further manipulated for data
analysis. The next set to be considered is an Event (E) which
consists of a set of elements (e) obtained from the objects of
T , and which changes the concept level from a transmission
of objects to a set of elements:
E = {e1, e2, e3, . . . , enE} (2)
where nE ∈ N and the following condition is also met:
∀ei ∈ E, 1 ≤ i ≤ nE , ei ∈ T (3)
How to construct ei from the objects of T is feature selection–
elements should be selected which can detect intrusions. An
example of possible elements for an event is the source IP
address, the destination IP address, the source and destination
ports, the protocol, and the size of a packet crossing the
network.
TABLE II
A SAMPLE EVENT
UDP 231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402
TABLE III
SAMPLE META-DATA
20100916 00:14:54 FW
Table 2 shows a sample event with the following elements:
The protocol is UDP, the source IP address is 231.240.64.213,
the destination IP address is 238.87.208.113, and the destina-
tion port is 16402. These elements were object elements in the
sample transmission set shown above. The process of pulling
data objects from a packet and saving them as Event elements
is called parsing the data.
The next step is to add Meta-data (M ), if appropriate, about
the event consisting of meta-data elements (m):
M = {m1,m2,m3, . . . ,mnM } (4)
where nM ∈ N . Meta-data is data about data. In this context,
it means data about the transmission that is not inside the
transmission, itself. Examples of meta-data are the time when
a packet crossed the network, the device which detected the
packet, the alert level from the device, the direction the packet
was travelling, and the reason the packet was detected. The
concept level has changed from a set of elements to a set of
meta-data about the set of elements.
Table 3 shows sample meta-data for an event. The meta-data
in this table is the date, 20100916, and the time, 00:14:54, at
which an appliance detected the transmission, and a label for
the appliance that detected the packet, FW.
A Record (R) of the event includes both the event, itself,
plus the meta-data:
R =M ∪ E (5)
An example of a record is an entry in a normalized firewall
log. The concept level has changed from a set of meta-data
to a set that includes both the elements and meta-data about
those elements. In practice, the meta-data typically occurs in
R before the elements to which the meta-data refers.
Table 4 is a sample record, which consists of meta-data and
elements from the previous examples for M and E. Before
proceeding to the next step, the attributes of R for a given
analysis should be in a fixed order because they can later
become coordinates in a location vector. Processing the data
into fixed orders of attributes is called normalizing the data.
A Log (L) of records is a partially ordered set:
L = {Ri}i∈N (6)
An example of a log is a file containing normalized firewall
log entries. An infinite-like log could be live streaming data.
TABLE IV
A SAMPLE RECORD
20100916 00:14:54 FW UDP 231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402
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A SAMPLE LOG
20100916 00:14:54 FW UDP 231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402
20100916 00:14:56 FW TCP 216.162.156.85 198.18.147.222 40833
20100916 11:14:57 FW ICMP 90.29.214.20 198.18.147.221 41170
Table 5 shows a sample log. It is like the sample record,
above, except there are three entries instead of just one entry.
The concept level has changed from a set of meta-data and
elements to a collection of sets of meta-data and elements.
L can be considered to be a set of vectors; L can also be
considered to be a matrix. If L is a text file, each line of
the file is one location vector and the entire file is a matrix,
changing the concept level to a matrix.
If the features have been selected successfully, an intrusion,
or one or more symptoms of it, should be able to be detectable
in L. Therefore, LLNIDS intrusions and intrusion detection
can be defined in terms of R and L. Let R be the universal
set of R and let I1 represent a set of R that describe a Type
1 Intrusion. Then I1 is the set:
I1 = {R|R ∈ R, R involves a Type 1 Intrusion } (7)
Formula 7 formulates a Type 1 Intrusion. Examples of Type
1 intrusions are a Ping of Death and a get request to a
known malicious web site. These intrusions can potentially
be prevented. I1 has the same attributes as L in that it can
be considered to be a set of location vectors or it can be
considered to be a matrix. As matrices, the number of columns
in I1 and L for an analysis must be the same, but the number
of rows in I1 and L can be different. For reference below, let
I1 be the universal set of all Type 1 intrusions. The concept
level for I1 has changed from a matrix to a set of matrices.
That was about intrusions. Now here is the function for Type
1 Intrusion Detection, ID1 :
ID1 (L) =
{
TRUE, ∃I1 ∈ I1 : I1 ⊆ L
FALSE, otherwise (8)
Formula 8 is the function for Type 1 Intrusion Detection,
which returns True if an intrusion has been detected, otherwise
it returns False. Next is Type 2 intrusions and intrusion
detection. In most cases, one or more events occur which
makes the security technician suspicious that an intrusion has
occurred, but more investigation is necessary in order to reach
a conclusion. This scenario, which is Type 2 Intrusion Detec-
tion, is similar to a patient going to a physician, who looks
for symptoms and then makes a decision about whether or not
the patient has a medical problem. The security technician also
looks for symptoms and then makes a decision about whether
or not an intrusion has occurred. Let R be the universal set of
R and let I2 represent a set of R that describes one or more
symptoms of a Type 2 Intrusion. Then I2 is the set:
I2 = {R|R ∈ R, R involves a Type 2 Intrusion } (9)
Formula 9 formulates a Type 2 Intrusion. Let R2 be the
universal set of all Type 2 intrusions. Now here is a formula
for Type 2 Intrusion Detection, ID2 :
ID2 (L) =
{
TRUE, ∃I2 ∈ I2 : I2 ⊆ L
FALSE, otherwise (10)
The ID2 (L) function returns True if a symptom of an
intrusion has been detected; otherwise it returns False. Possible
examples of Type 2 intrusions are the following: The set of
records consisting of a single local source IP address and
numerous unique destination addresses all with a destination
port of 445; the set of records consisting of a local IP address
sending numerous e-mails during non-working hours; and, the
set of records consisting of high volumes of UDP traffic on
high destination ports to a single local IP address matching
criteria set by a Self-Organizing Map. Like a cough does
not necessarily indicate a cold, the detection of an intrusion
symptom does not always indicate an intrusion.
That was Type 2 intrusions and intrusion detection. Next
is Type 3 intrusions, which are not detected in a given time
period. Let R be the universal set of R and let I3 represent a
set of R that describes a Type 3 Intrusion. Then I3 is the set:
I3 = {R|R ∈ R, R involves a Type 3 Intrusion } (11)
As a summary, compare these three types of intrusion
detection in a medical context to typhoid fever, which is spread
by infected feces. Type 1 intrusion detection (prevention) is
to wash one’s hands after using the toilet; Type 2 intrusion
detection is to recognize the symptoms, such as fever, stomach
ache, and diarrhea; Type 3 detection is represented by Typhoid
Mary, who had no readily recognizable symptoms.
The next step involves changing the data formats from
R and L into forms which can be directly manipulated by
analysis software. (Packet analysis can already occur directly
on T .) This involves converting records into vectors and
logs into matrices. This conversion is straightforward with a
Detailed Input Data Vector, VD, which starts as a set and is
then used later as a location vector:
VD ⊆ R (12)
More feature reduction can occur at this step. If the order
of each element in the set is fixed, i.e., if the order of the
attributes of the set are fixed, then the set can become a
location vector. An example of VD as a set is {1280093999,
10.3.4.10, 10.3.4.12, 445, TCP} which could indicate a time
stamp in seconds, a source IP address, a destination IP address,
a destination port, and a protocol. Converting IP addresses
to numerical formats, and assigning a numerical label to
TCP, the same example of VD as a location vector could be
(1280093999, 167969802, 167969804, 445, 6).
Aggregate elements are also possible for a given time
period, such as aggregate data for each local IP address for a
day. Examples of such aggregate elements are the total number
of R for the local IP address, the count of unique source IP
addresses communicating with the local IP address, and the
percentage of TCP network traffic for the local IP address.
Many other types of aggregate elements are possible. These
aggregate elements can be converted to an Aggregate Input
Data Vector, VA, with f being an aggregation function:
VA = {f1(L), f2(L), f3(L), . . . , fnV (L)} (13)
7where nV ∈ N . Again, the order of the attributes of the set
are fixed so that the set can become a location vector. An
example of VA as a set is {20100725, 428, 10.3.4.10, 48, 0.89}
which could indicate that on 7/25/2010 428 unique source IP
addresses attempted to contact destination IP address 10.3.4.10
on 48 unique destination ports with the TCP protocol being
used 89 percent of the time. The date and IP address become
a label for the location vector when the location vector is
created. From the same example above, the location vector
for IP address 10.3.4.10 on 7/25/2010 is (428, 48, 0.89).
Both of these types of sets/vectors can be generalized as a
General Input Data Vector, V :
V = VD or V = VA (14)
The next concept level is to generalize V so that it can be
used as input to a wide variety of Soft Computer and other
methods. The generalized elements of V are be represented
by e. V is an n-tuple of real numbers which can be perceived,
depending upon how it is intended as being used, as being a
set, a location vector, or a matrix:
Set : V = {e1, e2, e3, . . . , enV } (15)
V ector : V = (e1, e2, e3, . . . , enV ) (16)
Matrix : V = [e1 e2 e3 . . . enV ] (17)
where nV ∈ N . For example, if the elements of V are an n-
tuple of the real numbers 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1, then
V can be perceived as being a set, a vector or a matrix:
Set : V = {0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1} (18)
V ector : V = (0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1) (19)
Matrix : V = [0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1] (20)
An Input Data Matrix, D, is a collection of similar types of
V . Here D is represented as a set of V :
D = {V1, V2, V3, . . . , VnD} (21)
where nD ∈ N . D is on the same concept level as L. Both
D and L can be considered to be sets of location vectors or
a matrix. Here is how D can be represented as a matrix:
D =
 V1,1 · · · V1,nV... . . . ...
VnD,1 · · · VnD,nV
 (22)
where nD ∈ N and nV ∈ N .
For example, given these three location vectors, each rep-
resented as a matrix,
V1 = [0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1] (23)
V2 = [0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6] (24)
V3 = [0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4] (25)
D would be represented this way as a matrix:
D =
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.10.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
 (26)
DD can refer to an Input Data Matrix consisting of VD and
DA can refer to an Input Data Matrix consisting of VA. D
can also be one of these three types:
1) DTrain refers to a data set which is used to train the
software intelligence
2) DTest refers to a data set which is used to test the
software intelligence
3) DReal refers to feral data.
D can be used in virtually an infinite variety of analysis
methods, from spreadsheet methods to statistics and data
mining, to machine learning methods. For example, DTrain
can be used by clustering software which, after testing, would
then classify DReal for intrusion detection.
The ID Math Method more accurately defines informa-
tion security concepts and scientifically ties components of
information security together with structured and uniform
data structures. The LLNIDS can be extended to describe
existing and potential methodologies of analysis methods
including statistics, data mining, AIS, NeuroFuzzy, Swarm In-
telligence, and SOM, as well as Bayes Theory, Decision Trees,
Dempster-Shafer Theory, Evolutionary Computing, Hidden
Markov Models, and many other types of analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper provided a new way of looking at network
intrusion detection research including intrusion detection types
that are necessary, complete, and mutually exclusive to aid in
the fair comparison of intrusion detection methods and to aid
in focusing research in this area. This paper also provided
a methodical description of intrusion detection data and how
this data is manipulated and perceived from packet analysis
to sophisticated computational intelligence methods. This new
ID Math provides a methodological archetype from which to
move forth. Future work in intrusion detection research should
leverage these intrusion detection types and this computational
model for better descriptions of the problem sets and for
presenting solutions to intrusion detection.
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